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BROCATO v. SERIO

there can be no completed crime without another attempt,
or some further action, on the part of the accused. Is it,
then, really inconsistent to have an acquittal for assault and
a conviction for murder arising out of the same alleged act?
Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought, express or implied. Malice is implied (among other examples) when an act is wilfully done
or a duty wilfully omitted, and the natural tendency of the
act or omission is to cause death or great bodily harm. A
person may be guilty of murder at common law, although
there may have been no actual intent to kill.2 1 An assault
is an attempt to commit a battery, and intent, either actual
or apparent, is an essential of the crime. 22 Thus there can
be no conviction of assault without the intent, on the part of
the accused, to inflict bodily injury, but a conviction for
murder can be had without any intent on the part of the accused to injure anybody.2" Thus an assault is not a necessary element of murder, though of course it would be present in many cases.

PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL BASED ON A
HOLDING OUT BY ONE OTHER THAN
THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE HELD
Brocato v. Serio'
Suit was brought on a renewal note of "S. Brocato &
Son," a firm operating a market stall. Both defendants,
husband and wife, had been for some years closely connected
with this business, although it appeared that there was no
actual partnership. The plaintiff's knowledge of this connection was slight. The original loan had been made fourteen years before trial by the plaintiff in the presence of
both defendants and S. Brocato, the husband's father. All
later negotiations had been through plaintiff's sister-in-law.
On the death of the father, and at plaintiff's request, the
defendant wife signed her name to the renewal note and
signed her husband's name without his consent. The trial
court held that the defendants were estopped to deny lia1 Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra n. 20, Sec. 239.
2 Ibid, Sec. 197.
8 The principal case involved exactly such a situation.
fired through a closed door.
2 173 Md. 374, 196 Atl. 125 (1937).
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bility on the note as partners and, on appeal, this ruling was
affirmed.
The case came to the appellate court solely for a ruling
on the refusal by the trial court to grant certain prayers
for a directed verdict on the adduced evidence. In making
this ruling the opinion set out in some detail the evidence
and conflicting testimony brought forth at the trial. As
there was no demand for it, the Court evidently felt no need
to pass on the questions of partnership law presented at the
trial. For this reason it is somewhat difficult to gather
from the opinion a complete and clear picture of the findings
of fact and rulings of law comprising the sum total of the
decision finally rendered.
However, certain comments by way of dicta lend a peculiar interest to the case in their application to partnership
by estoppel. In speaking of the acts of the defendants, the
Court defined this type of relationship as follows :2
"A person not a partner in fact may be liable as
such to third persons, upon the ground that he has held
himself out to the world as such, or has permitted others
to do so, and is therefore estopped from denying that
he is one, as against those who have in good faith dealt
with the firm, or with him as a member of it. But it
must appear that the person dealing with the firm believed and had a reasonable right to believe that the
party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member of
the firm, and that the credit was to some extent induced
by this belief, and the holding out must have been by
the authority or with the knowledge of the party sought
to be charged. Whether the defendants in this case
held themselves out as members of the firm of S. Brocato and Son, or permitted it to be done, is a question
of fact and not of law. Fletcherv. Pullen."
The foregoing quotation seems to be an almost verbatim
statement from the opinion rendered in FletcherV. Pullen.'
It appears to hold that the mere knowledge on the part of
a person that he is being held out as a partner may be sufficient to bind that person with partnership liability. However, in order not only to weigh the meaning of the words
used, but to discover the connotations the entire definition
has accumulated, it is necessary to know the facts in the
latter case and to trace its history as part of the doctrine
it sought to express.
Ibid, 173 Md. 384-5.
Md. 205, 16 At. 887. 14 Am. St. Rep. 355 (1889).

8 70
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Partnership by estoppel is the term given to a particular
application of the old principle of equitable estoppel. Certain facts must be established before, as a matter of law,
the bar of estoppel will be raised. There must be, first, a
holding out by the party sought to be charged (i. e. that
there is a partnership in which he holds himself out as a
member); second, a reliance by the plaintiff on this holding
out; and, third, damage to the plaintiff.5 On this much of
our statement of the elements necessary to create a partnership by estoppel there seems to be general accord. Dispute may arise only on the question of whether the evidence
establishes the necessary facts. However, what of the situation where the holding out has been by a third party, and
the plaintiff, by bona fide and reasonable reliance thereon,
has been damaged? Here also the courts agree that an
estoppel may be created. But in determining the circumstances of fact under which this estoppel will be held, the
courts have differed.'
At common law, two lines of thought were followed on
this question. The weight of authority held that in a case
of a holding out by a third party, no liability on the part
of the person so held out would result unless he consented
to the representation. 7 The minority view followed by
some courts felt that mere knowledge that there had been
such a representation could fix liability on the ostensible
partner."
Fletcher v. Pullen,9 decided prior to the act, has been
considered as definitely placing Maryland with the minority
jurisdictions on this point. In that case, the defendant's
lessee had written letters to the plaintiff alleging a partnership between himself and his lessor, the defendant. In reliance on this supposed partnership the plaintiff had sold
the lessee goods, and in the suit sought to recover the price
from the defendant. The lessee had also caused to be published in two local papers an advertisement likewise representing that a partnership existed. The defendant had not
' Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Oles, 152 Misc. 876, 274 N. Y. S.
349 (1934) ; Hackney Co. v. Lee Hotel, 156 Tenn. 243, 300 S. W. 1 (1927) ;
Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, See. 91; 47 C. J., Partnership, See.
104, and cases cited.
47 C. J., Partnership, Sees. 104, 107; Rowley, op. cit. supra n. 4, Sec. 95.
'For a good discussion of partnership by estoppel under the common
law, see Thompson v. First Nat. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 28 L. Ed. 507 (1884).
47 C. J., Partnership, See. 106; Rowley, op. cit. supra n. 4, See. 475;
Thompson v. First National Bank, su1pra n. 6.
8 Lutz v. Miller, 102 W. Va. 23, 135 S. E. 168, 50 A. L. R. 426 (1926) ; 20
R. C. L. 1067; for further cases on these two views see those cited in Crane,
Partnership, See. 36, and In the Commissioners' note to Sec. 16, Uniform
Partnership Act, Sub-div. 1-b.
ISupra n. 3.
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known of the letters but had seen the advertisement which
had run for some weeks. Evidence by the defendant lessor
tending to show that he had denied to the editors of the
papers the alleged partnership asserted in the advertisement and also had -several times publicly stated that there
was no such partnership was denied admission, as was a
copy of the lease. The appellate court reversed the judgment for plaintiff because of the non-admission of this evidence. But in spite of the negative character of this holding, the effect of the decision would seem to be strong. An
implication is raised that had the defendant merely stood
on the absence of proof of actual consent-had there been
no offered proof of affirmative denial by the defendant-the
judgment of the trial court would have gone undisturbed.
This is the more apparent because the language of the opinion in several places appears to state in unequivocal terms
the minority rule that in some cases knowledge alone may
bind a person held out as partner.10 Later cases restated
known landthe doctrine,1 and it had become by 1915 a well
12
mark in the field of partnership by estoppel.
In 1916, the Uniform Partnership Act became a part of
Maryland law.'3 This uniform statute purports to take the
majority view contrary to the implication of Fletcher v.
Pullen. 4 In the words of the Commissioners:
"The section clears several doubts and confusions
of our existing case law. It has been held that a person is liable if he has been held out as a partner and
knows that he is being held out, unless he prevents such
holding out, even if to do so he has to take legal action.
10See the quotation from the principal case, supra n. 2. For a very real
conception of how far the doctrine that mere knowledge may create an
estoppel can be carried, see Lindley, Partnership, 75, and the cases there
set out.
"ILighthiser v. Allison, 100 Md. 103, 59 Atl. 182 (1904) ; Porter v. Connolly, 112 Md. 250, 75 At. 510 (1910) ; Cantor v. Balto. Overall Mfg. Co.,
121 Md. 65, 87 AtI. 1115 (1913) ; Erdman v. Trustees M. P. Church, 129
Md. 595, 99 AtI. 793 (1917).
12 Mechem, Elements of Partnership, in the text of Sec. 104, cites Fletcher
v. Pullen as a leading case, while criticising the decision on the facts in the
footnote to that section.
13 Md. Code, Art. 73A.
reads: "When a person, by words
14 Md. Code, Art. 73A, Section 16 (1)
spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another
representing him to anyone, as a partner in an existing partnership or with
one or more persons not actually partners, he is liable to any such person
to whom such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such
representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if he
has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public
manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has
not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or with
the knowledge of the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its being made."
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(Citing Fletcher v. Pullen). On the other hand, the
weight of authority is to the effect that to be held as a
partner, he must consent to the holding and that consent is a matter of fact. (Cited cases omitted). The
Act as drafted follows this weight of authority and better reasoning." 5
Text writers recognized this stand taken by the act. 6 It
was apparently believed that the wording was incapable of
misconstruction. All in all it appeared to offer a happy
solution-a reasonably clear and logical legal framework
upon which to place factual questions as to holding out and
consent, and a theory which satisfactorily embraced the
correlative problems of agency and liability between persons or partnerships so estopped.
Maryland law remains confused in the decisions by citations of, and quotations from Fletcher v. Pullen, without
any direct indication of whether its narrow view is meant
to be retained despite the adoption of the Uniform Act
or whether it is being cited for such sections of its opinion
as are consistent with the Act. Section 16 has been cited
in the Court of Appeals twice since its enactment. 7 During
the same period there have been three citations of Fletcher
v. Pullen, including that in the principal case.'8
The Maryland Court in this oft quoted excerpt seems to
differ with the Commissioners' own statement as to the
effect of Section 16 on Fletcher v. Pullen. The Court may
feel, however, that by a broad interpretation, the expression
"by conduct . . . consents" in Section 16 under certain
circumstances may be made to embrace mere knowledge. 9
If this is the explanation, then it would seem that the Commissioners had signally failed in their draftsmanship of
this section to achieve the result which they were apparently
15Commissioners' note to Sec. 16, Sub-div. 1-b.
26 Rowley, op. cit. supra n. 4. Sec. 12; Burdick, Partnership, 72-3; Crane,
op. cit. supra n. 8, 127 says: "A duty to affirmatively disclaim reputed
partnership has been imposed in some cases (citing Fletcher v. Pullen).
Other cases have held that there is no duty to deny false representations
of partnership, to the making of which one is not a party (cases omitted).
The Uniform Partnership Act is designed to impose liability only where
there is consent in fact to the representations."
17 Blaustein v. Oldfield, 135 Md. 162, 108 AtI. 485 (1919) ; Southern Can
Co. v. Sayler, 152 Md. 303, 136 AtI. 624 (1927). In the latter case the citation is merely a passing reference to Sec. 16, as being an exception to Sec.

7(1).
18

Blaustein v. Oldfield, supra n. 17; West v. Driscoll, 142 Md. 205, 120
Ati. 445 (1923); supra circa n. 2.
I' As is suggested by such cases as Triangle Machine Co. v. Dutton &
Adams, 13 La. App. 14, 127 So. 54 (1930), where the court stated: "If
one knows his name Is used as a partner, though without his consent his
acquiescence may be inferred if he does not publicly disclaim the connection."
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confident they had accomplished. However, it is equally
possible that the citations since the passage of the Act were
never intended to be taken as confirmations of the minority
rule of the Commissioners' interpretation of Fletcher v.
Pullen, since that was never necessary for the decision in
hand.
The Court when presented once more with a proper case,
may find it desirable to clarify its position as to the real
effect of Section 16 on its former doctrine of partnership
by estoppel.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOCAL TRANSACTIONS
AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Consolidated Edison Company of New York v.
National Labor Relations Board'
In a proceeding under the National Labor Relations
Act2 to restrain alleged unfair labor practices on the part
of the petitioners, where the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board was contested on the ground that
the petitioners were engaged in intrastate production and
distribution of electric power and gas to local consumers,
but where it was shown that a small percentage of the petitioners' output was utilized by certain consumers in the
maintenance and operation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, Held: (with two justices dissenting') that
the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction over
the petitioners' intrastate operations in order to prevent
labor disputes which might result in disrupting the petitioners' service, hampering and obstructing the interstate
activities of the petitioners' customers.4
159 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
249 Stat. 449 (1935) ; 29 U. S. C. A. 151 et seq.
I Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented on this point, 59 S. Ct. 206,
221.
1 In addition to the question of jurisdiction, the point wirn which this
note is concerned, the case also involved a consideration of procedural
due process in the fairness of the hearings before the board and the
sufficiency of the evidence, and the power of the board to abrogate
contracts between the employer and an independent labor organization without notice to that union. From the majority's opinion adverse to the
board on the latter point, Justices Reed and Black dissented, 59 S. Ct.

206, 224.

For additional discussion of the jurisdiction element of the case, see
(1939) 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 480, (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 373, (1939) 48 Labor
Review 121. For a discussion of the due process point, see (1939) 48
Labor Review 121, 123.
For a discussion of the invalidation of union contracts, see (1939)
6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319; (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 695, (1939) 48 Labor Review 121, 124.

